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A few years after the establishment of the European Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU), large asymmetries emerged in the trade balances and the current accounts of the 
member-states. A divide seems to separate two groups in the euro area, one with the 
northern countries achieving external surpluses and the other including the southern 
countries with large external deficits. We argue that a crucial factor in shaping 
productivity, and consequently affecting competitiveness and the external position of the 
economy, is the size and composition of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and find that 
the northern countries received more total FDI than the southern group. Moreover, the 
southern countries attracted more investment in real estate rather than the productive 
sector. Focusing on ten euro area economies over the period 1980-2009, we establish a 
positive relationship between FDI flows and trade balances in the northern countries, in 
contrast to a negative one for the southern group. Using industry-level data, we also 
establish a positive (negative) long-run relationship between FDI in the manufacturing 
(non-manufacturing) sector and the trade balance for the northern (southern) countries. 
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Since the global crisis in 2008, several communiqués issued by the European 
Commission on the economic situation in the euro area countries adopted an increasingly 
alarming tone over their external imbalances.
1 There was hardly any comparable worry in 
the early years, let alone during the preparation of EMU as most of the attention was 
concentrated on the fiscal and monetary aspects of the integration process. Since the 
introduction of the common currency ruled out competitive devaluations, little attention 
was paid to the external disparities, until the global crisis revealed that countries with 
sizeable current account deficits are more vulnerable to international market pressures 
and recessions. 
In an early study of external imbalances in EMU, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) 
offered the comforting explanation that increased integration of capital markets is likely 
to result in large current account deficits. In such a context, they disregarded any 
explosive pattern in the medium run, and argued that countries such as Portugal and 
Greece need not take measures to reduce their deficits. Only when deficits reached 
alarming levels, did Blanchard (2007) turn away from his benign-neglect suggestion and 
stressed that as “…current account deficits steadily increased… within the Euro, 
Portugal (and) Spain (have a) reason to worry, (…as) deficits are too large, …( and ) 
implications can be bad”. Recent studies show that, especially since the intensification of 
the financial crisis, highly indebted EMU countries with large external deficits are also 
found to experience the highest sovereign bond yield spreads [e.g. Alexopoulou et al. 
(2009), Attinasi et al. (2009), Barrios et al. (2009)]. The pairwise correlations for the 
post-EMU era between government debt, current account and sovereign spreads in 
Figures 1 and 2, as expected, indicate that the current account (government debt) relative 
to Germany is negatively (positively) correlated with sovereign spreads.  
Figure 1 and 2 here 
The complacent view held that the external deficits of the euro area countries have 
been a demand-driven phenomenon, even though evidence did not supporting this 
approach. In fact, a study by Arghyrou and Chortareas (2008) suggested that “other 
                                                 
1 See, among others, (EC 2009).  
  5factors beyond income growth may explain the current account positions of Greece, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain” and find that developments in the real effective exchange rate and 
consequently in competitiveness is a decisive one. 
Using the direction of how external imbalances have evolved after the adoption of 
the common currency, two groups suggest themselves in the euro area. The first consists 
of the northern countries of the euro area (henceforth called the “North”) where external 
balances have improved since the creation of the EMU, while the second includes the 
southern euro area countries (henceforth called the “South”) which experienced large 
external deficits.
2 Even more interesting is the fact that – contrary to the early optimism – 
this divergence was widening over time, reaching unprecedented levels in recent years. 
But what has caused such divergences in external balances? Our paper suggests that 
different patterns of FDI inflows across the countries in the “North” and the “South” 
groups have resulted in systematic productivity gaps and diverging external accounts. 
The establishment of EMU has been of paramount importance for the movement of 
capital in the euro area and consequently for the shaping of production capabilities in the 
member states. FDI can bring many changes that should benefit the host country, such as 
speeding-up the adoption of new technologies, increasing competition, upgrading human 
capital, giving access to foreign markets etc. FDI inflows to the euro area stemmed either 
from intra-EMU reallocations or from outside the euro area, although the particular 
weights are still debated. For example, Petroulas (2008) finds that EMU led mainly to 
higher intra-euro area FDI flows, and to a lower extent raised FDI inflows from outside. 
By contrast, Taylor (2008) shows that if FDI inflows to and from Belgium-Luxemburg 
are removed, it appears that EMU has been a significant stimulus to investment only from 
non-euro to euro area countries. 
When exploring time series data for each country we observe that although all euro 
area countries have attracted higher FDI inflows since the creation of EMU, there seems 
to exist sharp differences in the size of inflows attracted by each country/group. In 
                                                 
2 The categorisation of euro area countries into two groups is adopted only for the purpose of studying the interactions 
between external balances and FDI flows, and should not be taken to imply a deep-down division on all fronts of 
economic activities. For example, after EMU Greece experienced a real-estate boom that was weaker than Finland, 
while France proved to be a lot more resilient than Ireland after the global crisis in 2008. 
  6particular, it seems that the “North” has attracted a lot more FDI in comparison with the 
“South”. 
Since the seminal work of Mundell (1957), many papers have aimed at shedding 
light on the effect of FDI on the host county’s activities, though their findings have been 
far from conclusive.
3 It appears that the nature of the trade-FDI nexus depends on many 
factors such as the level of aggregation (microeconomic, sectoral, and macroeconomic) 
and the country and time period under investigation. It is reasonable to expect that the 
FDI effect will differ significantly between the short run and the long run, depending on 
the nature of the imported goods in the short run [see e.g. Fontagne (1999)]. Hence, 
although FDI can attract machinery imports and cause a deterioration in the host 
country’s trade balance in the short run, these imported goods can serve as vehicles of 
positive externalities and improve the trade balance in the long run. To this effect, 
Coeurdacier et al. (2009) find a positive effect of the European integration on cross 
border mergers and acquisitions in the manufacturing sector, while the impact on the 
services sector is not statistically significant. In addition, as pointed out by Xiao et al. 
(2008) “….(t)he “South” has experienced increasing FDI inflows in recent years, but the 
distribution was not even, and, in particular Greece and Italy have been lagging….Much 
of the FDI to the “South” has been in the service sector…”. This caveat is of particular 
importance since the potential externalities associated with FDI inflows might differ 
markedly across industries [UNCTAD (2001)]. After all, the empirical discussions that 
concern spillover effects on productivity and exports are often concentrated in the 
manufacturing sector [see e.g. Aitken et al. (1997), Aitken and Harrison (1999), Chuang 
and Hsu (2004), Dimelis and Louri (2002) and Greenway et al. (2004)]. 
As far as the composition of FDI inflows is concerned, it seems that the “North” 
has attracted significantly more investments in the productive sector in comparison with 
the “South”, whereas the increased FDI inflows in the ”South” have been dominated by 
investment in real estate activities. To that end, a promising framework to explain the 
disparities in external balances is to examine whether this heterogeneity in size and 
composition of FDI inflows has led to different patterns of productivity and trade 
                                                 
3 For a survey of the literature see Lipsey (2002), Gorg and Greenway (2004) and Filippaios and Kottaridi (2008). 
  7balances in the two groups. In an early study for Ireland, Ruane and Gorg (1999) showed 
that its economy was completely transformed as a result of the massive flow of foreign 
affiliates. More specifically, Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) were exporting over 70% 
of their output and accounted for two thirds of manufacturing net output and half of 
employment.  
The theoretical analysis is based on the framework developed - among many others 
- by Brock (1988), Engel and Kletzer (1989) Brock and Turnovsky (1994) and Turnovsky 
(1996) that describes a  two-sector dynamic model with traded and non-traded goods. The 
economy accumulates two types of capital stock, one that is internationally traded and 
another that is non-traded. In the present context the former represents productive 
investments such as in manufacturing, while the latter type of capital may be seen as 
investment in non-traded services, such as real-estate or land for which construction 
permits have been obtained, as in Wincoop (1990). Both types of capital are employed in 
both sectors. Inward foreign investment is treated as a rise (outward investment as a 
reduction) in the stock of internationally-traded capital and can be allocated to both 
sectors of the economy albeit at different intensities. The economy may be relatively 
capital-intensive either in the traded or the non-traded sector and this gives rise to the so-
called “Rybsczynski effect”, according to which an increase in a factor of production 
shifts the composition of output in favour of the sector which is relatively intensive in 
that factor. In such a context, if a country is FDI-intensive in the productive sector, an 
inflow will increase traded output and improve the trade balance. On the other hand, if it 
is attracts FDI mainly in the service sector, this will lead to a relative contraction of the 
traded sector and the trade balance will deteriorate. 
Our empirical analysis aims to test the main predictions of the model. For that 
purpose we use an error correction model in order to disentangle the short- and long-run 
effects of aggregate and industry level FDI inflows on the trade balance of goods and 
services for ten euro area countries over the period 1980-2009. Our main results can be 
summarized as follows. Firstly, we find a positive long-run relationship between FDI 
inflows and trade balances for the “North”, while a negative one holds for the “South”. 
Secondly, these results seem to be driven by the sub-period 1999-2009, during which we 
observe a substantial rise in the net inflow of FDI in the euro area. Thirdly, when we use 
  8industry level data we find a positive (negative) long-run relationship between FDI in 
manufacturing (non-manufacturing) sector and the trade balance for the “North” 
(“South”). Hence, when FDI inflows are channeled to the productive/tradable 
(unproductive/non-tradable) sector, this leads to substantial improvement (deterioration) 
in productivity and competitiveness in the long run.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discuses the data and 
presents basis statistics on the evolution of external accounts and FDI inflows within the 
euro area. Section 3 presents the theoretical analysis and demonstrates the key 
implications. Section 4 describes the empirical strategy and contains the econometric 
results. Finally, section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. External asymmetries in the euro area and investment patterns  
In this section, we present evidence for the development of external balances and 
investment patterns in the euro area over the last thirty years. More specifically, our 
sample spans the period 1980 to 2009 and includes 10 euro area countries. The countries 
of our sample are Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain. We exclude Belgium and Luxemburg from our research first because 
separate data for each country exist only after 2002 and second, because Belgium and (to 
a greater extent) Luxemburg have received an extremely large amount of FDI inflows 
part of which was subsequently channeled to other euro area countries. 
The main variables of interest in our analysis are the FDI inflows (FDI) and the net 
trade in goods and services (Trade balance), both scaled by GDP and expressed as a 
percentages. These data are obtained from International  Financial Statistics - of the 
International Monetary Fund (annual edition online version). A complete list of variables 
used in our analysis is provided in Appendix A with details on data sources and 
descriptive statistics. It is worth noting that we abstain from using the current account 
  9balance in order to avoid potential biases in the results. This measure includes net factor 
income from investments to/from abroad and thus it is directly associated with FDI.
4  
Table 1 reports the average trade balance for two sub periods before and after the 
adoption of EMU, namely from 1980 to 1998 and 1999 to 2009 respectively.
5 Two 
groups of the euro area countries are considered according to whether their balances have 
been improved or deteriorated after EMU.
6 The group characterized as “North” includes 
five countries, namely Austria, Finland, Germany, Ireland and Netherlands, and exhibits 
an average improvement of 4.37% of GDP in the trade balance. On the contrary, the 
group termed as “South” includes the rest of euro area countries, namely France, Greece, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain, and shows an average deterioration of 0.95% of GDP in the 
trade balance. 
Table 1 here  
It is worth noting at this point that a similar pattern emerges for the current account 
balances, which improve in the “North” (with the exception of Ireland over the recent 
years) but deteriorate in the “South” (see Figure 3). Although there is no established 
benchmark at which point a current account deficit may cause an economy-wide crisis, it 
is useful to recall that the balance of payments crises in Latin America over the last three 
decades took place with external deficits ranging between 6% and 8% of the respective 
country’s GDP, a level far below the recent developments in some of the southern euro 
area countries. Despite the fact that most of the southern economies were historically 
prone to deficits, none of them experienced such a quick and sharp deterioration in the 
trade/current account balance in the past. This represented a wholly new type of 
asymmetry in the euro area. 
Figure 3 here 
                                                 
4 For instance Ireland suffered from current account deficits after 2000 due to rising factor income payments abroad 
that are associated with large amount of inward FDI inflows that occurred in the preceding years. However, the country 
continues to enjoy high surpluses on the trade balance.  
5 The substance of the results remains the same if instead of this sample we use data eleven years before and eleven 
years after the creation of the EMU. 
6 The fact that Portugal’s trade balance is improved in the post-EMU era is mainly attributed to the fact that during 
1982 and 1983 the trade deficit was above 20 percentage points of GDP. If we exclude these observations, trade 
balance seems to deteriorate by 1% f GDP after the creation of EMU. In addition, we can add a country to the high 
competitive economies of the “North” that runs on average trade deficits above 8% of GDP during the whole period. 
  10One factor that seems to have played a key role in shaping productivity, and 
consequently affecting the external position of the economy, stems from the different 
patterns of FDI inflows towards the two groups of the euro area.  Examining the FDI 
inflows before and after EMU, they are found to display the following features. First 
there is the difference in size as can be seen in Table 2: Before EMU both euro area 
groups were receiving a more or less similar net inflow of FDI. However, in the first 
years of the new monetary regime, a substantial increase in FDI inflows of about 4% of 
GDP relative to the period 1980-98 took place in the “North”, while the “South” 
experienced an increase of only 1.18% of GDP. Figure 4 plots this stark contrast between 
the two groups.  
Table 2 and Figure 4 here 
Second, in the “North”, the productive sector has attracted significantly more 
investment in comparison with the “South”. FDI inflows at the industry level are 
available from the OECD’s International Direct Investment database.
7 In order to 
observe investment patterns at the industry level in the two groups we employ two 
variables, FDI Manufacturing and FDI Real Estate, both scaled by GDP and expressed as 
percentages. The former includes FDI only in the manufacturing sector, while the latter 
includes FDI in real estate, renting and business activities, FDI in construction activities 
and FDI in hotel and restaurants. In Figure 5 we see that the “North” has attracted 
significantly more FDI inflows in the manufacturing sector, while the increased FDI 
inflows after 1999 for the “South” were dominated by investment in real estate activities.
8  
In addition, as Figure 6 demonstrates, FDI manufacturing ( FDI Real estate) is 
positively (negatively) correlated with the trade balance.
9 Hence, by distinguishing 
between investment in productive activities and investment in the real estate sector, a 
different pattern of inward investment and output composition emerges for the two 
                                                 
7 This database except for FDI at the industry level provides also data for total FDI inflows. We prefer, though, using 
data for total FDI inflows from the International Financial Statistic, since this database provides also quarterly data for 
total FDI inflows that we will use at a later stage of our research. It is worth noting that our results (available upon 
request) remain unaffected if we alternatively use data for total FDI inflows from OECD’s International Direct 
Investment database. 
8 Because of missing data for variable FDI Real estate, we reduce our sample to period 1991-2009, in order to have 
equal number of observations for both variables.  
 
9 It is worth noting that we calculate correlations for countries that we have at least 10 observations available, in order 
to avoid, to the extent possible, small size distortions.  
  11groups. When FDI inflows are directed mainly to the tradable sector this leads to 
substantial productivity improvements. In contrast, investment going mostly to the real 
estate sector boosts aggregate demand, raises prices causes the real exchange rate to 
appreciate and hinders competitiveness. This differentiation has profound consequences 
for the supply of traded and non-traded output and can be used to explain the diverging 
pattern in the trade balances and current accounts. 
Figures 5 and 6 here 
3. Theoretical framework 
Following Turnovsky (1996), the economy is inhabited by a single infinitely-lived 
representative agent who provides labour inelastically and accumulates two types of 
capital, traded (K) and non-traded (H). The first sector produces internationally traded 
goods ( ), and is subsequently referred to as the ‘productive’  sector. The second 
produces non-traded goods ( ), and is referred to as the ‘service’  sector.  The 
international price of traded goods is taken as unity and the relative price of non-traded 
goods is denoted by
T Y
N Y
p .  
3.1. The two-sector model 
Using continuous-time representation, production functions and capital 
accumulation dynamics are described as follows. A dot indicates time derivatives and 
subscripts T and N the traded and non-traded sector of the economy respectively: 
Traded sector output:        
1
TT T YA K H
α α − =                       
(1a) 
Non-traded output:                 
1
NN N YB K H
β β − =                        
(1b) 
Total output:            N T Y Y Y + =                      
(2a) 
Total consumption:                 N T C C C + =                      
(2b) 
Net exports:           TT X YCI = −−                      
(3a) 
  12Current account:                     TT B rB X rB Y C I
•
= +=+− −                 
(3b) 
Traded capital stock:           N T K K K + =                                    
(4a) 
                                      K KI δ
•
= −+                              
(4b) 
Non-traded capital stock:        N T H H H + =                                               
(5a) 
                                    () NN H HY C I εψ
•
=− + − −                   
(5b) 
The first two equations (1a, b) are homogeneous Cobb-Douglas production 
functions for the traded and non-traded sector with constant returns to scale, traded 
capital intensities  1 , 0 < < β α  and exogenous technologies , respectively. For 
simplicity, labour is not included here as a factor of production and there is no role for 
government although such extensions are straightforward as in Brock (1988). Equations 
(2a, b) denote the decomposition of output and consumption, (3a) denotes exports of 
internationally traded goods net of imports and (3b) the accumulation dynamics of bonds 
(B) held abroad by the agent at an exogenous world interest rate (r). Equations (4a, b) 
express the decomposition and dynamics of the traded capital stock, while (5a, b) those 
for the non-traded capital with δ and ε denoting depreciation rates respectively. FDI is 
represented by the exogenous variable (I). 
, AB> 0
                                                
The last term in (5b) represents installation costs of traded capital. Turnovsky 
(1996) treats the costs of installing new capital only in terms of traded goods which has 
the consequence that investment decisions are not sensitive to the relative price of non-
traded goods. However, this is not a plausible assumption if one takes into account that 
the real-estate boom and the sharp rise in housing prices in several euro area countries 
over the last decade have adversely affected investment in the productive sectors of their 
economies.
10 To capture this fact we assume, as in Brock (1988), that installing traded 
 
10 When, for example, a new factory is installed costs for designating the appropriate land and then obtaining a license 
to build and operate in it may soar when the size of investment rises, due either to scarcity of industrial land or to the 
resistance that was frequently organized against production sites fearing that they might undervalue the housing 
investment in the area. 
  13capital entails costs paid in terms of non-traded goods and is given by the simple convex 
function: 
2 () I I ψ σ ≡         ( 6 )  
where (σ) is a constant. No installation costs are assumed for non-traded investment. This 
implies that land for construction is readily available so that extending its stock by 
issuing new construction permits does not involve additional costs. 
Perfect mobility of both types of capital is assumed between traded and non-traded 
sectors so that rental prices of each factor as expressed by the marginal revenues are 































≡        (7b) 
3.2 Solving the model 
Combining (7a, b) with (1a, b) and (2a), the rental prices of the two types of capital 







− =         ( 8 a )  
  HH R Zp
α
α β − =         (8b) 
 
where   and  K H Z Z  are abbreviations of model parameters as derived in Appendix B.   
Combining the shares of factor incomes with identities (2a) and (4a) we obtain 
sectoral outputs as a function of total capital stocks and their respective returns, namely: 










                 
(9a) 













    (9b) 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
  14Different patterns in the capital intensity of the two sectors, i.e. whether  α β >  or 
α β < ,  give rise to the so-called “Rybsczynski effect”, according to which an increase in 
a factor of production shifts the composition of output in favour of the sector which is 
relatively intensive in that factor [see Rybsczynski (1955)].  
Typically we expect that α β > , but there are situations where this may be 
otherwise. One reason that might lead to economies exhibiting α β <  is the presence of 
congestion in the production of traded goods. In the present context we treat non-traded 
capital stock (such as, for example, industrial land) as a scarce factor which is congested 
by the installation of manufacturing capital. Using the formulation of Braun (1993) as 




TT TT T T T YA K H H K A K H
ωω ω ω − =⋅ =
− − +
x
          (1c) 
where  x is a “congestion indicator”. When obstruction is strong enough so that 
i.e. , x ω βα ω >− =−< β  we have a case where the service sector becomes 
relatively intensive in internationally-traded capital stock. Looking whether such a pattern 
exists in the euro area countries, it is interesting to examine the quality of the regulatory 
environment as a proxy for the facilitation of FDI installation in the traded sector. One 
such measure is offered by the ranking the Worldwide Governance Indicators over the 
years 1996 to 2008, as produced by the World Bank. As shown in Figure 7, there seems 
to be a clear dichotomy between the two groups, with the southern countries having 
consistently inferior quality regulation relative to the northern members.  




























N T β α            (10b) 
The representative agent chooses the set { } I C C N T , ,  at each time t to maximize the 
intertemporal utility function: 
  151 1
0
1
() [ ( ) ( ) ]
1
s




− − ≡+ ⋅ + ⋅
− ∫
ρ − ⋅       (11) 
whereρ  is the rate of time preferences, γ  is the CRRA coefficient and θ  the 
composition of consumption between traded and non-traded goods. Subject to the 
constraints given in (3b), (4b) and (5b), the solution provides the optimal consumption 
and investment decisions as functions of the price of non-traded goods (p) and the price 
of installed productive capital (Q). Details are given in Appendix B. 
To study how investment decisions were affected by the establishment of EMU, the 
latter is naturally represented as a permanent fall in real interest rates (r). Following a 
reduction in real interest rates, prices of non-traded goods (p) and the price of installed 
productive capital (Q) are shown to converge to a new equilibrium on a saddle-path. 
Details are given in Appendix B. However, the dynamics of adjustment differ according 
to whether the economy is traded-capital intensive in the productive or the service sector. 
Distinguishing between the two cases as shown in Figures 8a and 8b we derive a number 
of stylized facts for the two groups of the euro area. 
3.3. Stylized facts 
Using the results in Appendix B, the following propositions are established: 
Proposition 1:  A permanent shock to the world interest rate causes prices to 
diverge between countries that are relatively FDI-intensive in the productive sector and 
those which are so in the service sector. This, in turn, causes a productivity gap between 
the two groups. 
Proof: The adjustment path of relative prices after a permanent reduction of real 
interest rates is given in Figures 8a and 8b for the two types of economies and implies 
that it falls in the north and rises in the south. Consequently, we expect that inflation rates 
in the north should have been clearly lower than those in the south. Assuming that wages 
in both types of countries are adjusted to inflation, this leads to a productivity gap equal 
to the accumulated inflation differentials as shown in Figure 9a.  
Evidence: Average inflation rates of the consumer price index are displayed in 
Figure 9b for the two groups of the euro area after the establishment of EMU. In the 
beginning, inflation rates are at similar levels for both groups, but subsequently they 
  16diverge sharply. Average inflation in the southern group exceeded that in the North by an 
average of one percentage unit during the period 2002-2007.  
Proposition 2:  In the face of a permanent reduction in the interest rate, asset prices 
of installed capital stock rise in both types of economies. 
Proof:  As shown in Figure 8a, adjustment to the new equilibrium in the first type 
of the economy takes place without overshooting. After the initial jump, asset prices are 
rising further and converge gradually to the new steady-state. Figure 8b is drawn for the 
economy with α β <  and shows that the asset price jumps immediately to the new 
equilibrium without further rise. The initial reaction is likely to be stronger in this case. 
Evidence: Asset prices are approximated by using quarterly stock market indices of 
the euro area countries normalized at the same base in the first month of 1997, two years 
before the start of EMU. A simple average is taken to denote the evolution of asset prices 
in each euro area group and Figure 10 displays the average asset prices in the two groups 
in the aftermath of EMU. The initial response of the southern average index after the 
EMU shock is stronger than that of the northern group, as predicted by the above 
analysis. 
Proposition 3: FDI flows are expected to be higher in an economy where the 
productive sector is relatively intensive in FDI capital. 
Proof: Dividing the optimal investment rules as in (A6) for “North” and “South” 
respectively, and using superscripts for the two groups we obtain: 
(12) 





FDI north p Q






Evidence: All fractions in the r.h.s. tend to be above unity; the first because the 
installation of FDI is more costly in the South due to less efficient regulation (see Figure 
7), and the second term by virtue of Proposition 1. The last term as explained above is 
below unity, but not enough to overturn the other two effects (see Figure 10). All these 
reasons combined, result to a higher FDI inflows in the northern group of the euro area as 
shown in Figure 4. 
  17Proposition 4: After a fall in real interest rates, the proportion of productive 
investment to total FDI shrinks in economies with α β < . The outcome in economies with 
α β >  depends on the change of relative prices, but in general it is expected to be lower 
than in the former case. 
Proof: See Appendix B. 
Evidence: Figure 5 shows the average shares of investment in manufacturing and in 
real estate for the two groups before and after the EMU, so that the relative compositions 
can be calculated. Before EMU, the proportion of manufacturing to the sum of the two 
types of FDI was 70% and 58% for the north and south respectively, giving a ratio of 
1.20 between the two groups. After EMU the proportions were 40% and 22% 
respectively, making the ratio of north to south to rise to 1.82. 
 
Proposition 5: If the traded (non-traded) sector is relatively intensive in traded 
capital, then FDI inflows are positively (negatively) correlated with trade balances. 
Proof: If foreign investment is treated as a rise in the stock of traded capital, then 
by recalling (9a) the following implications for the two cases are immediately derived:   
(i) If the economy is relatively capital-intensive in the production of traded output, 
FDI will be directed in greater proportions to the traded sector. In this case, traded output 
expands relatively more than the output of the non-traded sector, thus improving the trade 
balance.  
(ii) If the economy is relatively capital-intensive in the non-traded sector, then most 
of the internationally traded FDI will be attracted by the service sector and production 
will shift towards non-traded goods. As a result, the trade balance deteriorates as shown 
in Figure 11. Figure 3 provides a clear evidence of the divergence between the two euro 
area groups. 
 
  184. Econometric analysis 
4.1. Empirical strategy  
The empirical approaches applied to estimate the external account determinants 
have differed substantially across studies [see e.g. Arghyrou and Chortareas (2008), 
Chinn and Prasad (2003), Schmitz and Von Hagen (2009)] and particular caution seems 
warranted in specifying an appropriate model. All specification tests discussed in this 
section are carried out for two different panels containing (i) the northern European 
countries and (ii) the southern European countries.  
We begin our empirical analysis with an examination of the unit root properties of 
the baseline series involved in our analysis. It is well known that structural breaks can be 
mistaken for non-stationarity [(see Perron (1989)]. Hence, we use the Carrion-i-Silvestre 
et al. (2005) panel unit root test, which extends the panel unit-root test of Hadri (2000) to 
allow for heterogenous structural breaks by applying the Bai and Perron (1998) 
procedure. Tables 3 and 4 display the location of the breaks and the unit root tests for the 
two different panels. Based on these results we can conclude that we can reject the null of 
stationarity for both variables with or without the presence of structural breaks.  
Table 3 and 4 here 
Once the existence of a panel unit root has been established, the second stage 
involves testing for the existence of a long-run relationship between the variables under 
study. Due to the short and narrow dimension of our panel, no Johansen-related system-
based test is performed since it is likely to be the most distorted. Instead, we use the 
alternatives of applying Kao’s (1999)  and Pedroni’s (1999)  residual-based tests that 
assume a single cointegrating vector. Based on Gutierrez (2003), Kao’s panel tests have 
higher power than Pedroni’s tests when a small-T number of observations are included in 
a homogeneous panel. Based on Kao’s (1999) statistics, reported in Table 5, the null 
hypothesis is always rejected and therefore we have indications that variables trade 
balance and FDI are cointegrated.  
Table 5 here 
  19In order to estimate the long-run relationship, the selected approach is the Pooled 
Mean Group (PMG) estimator proposed by Pesaran et al. (1999a). This method allows for 
the short-and long-run effects of FDI inflows on the net trade balance of the euro area 
countries to be disentangled. Our method can be summarized as a panel error correction 
model, where short-and long-run effects are estimated jointly from a general 
autoregressive distributed-lag (ARDL) model and where short-run coefficients, the speed 
of adjustment and error variances are allowed to vary across countries, but the long-run 
coefficients are constrained to be the same. 
Initially we restrict our estimations to include only the key variables of interest, i.e. 
trade balance and FDI inflows. A fairly general dynamic specification is represented by 
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By re-parameterising and stacking time series observations together, the Pooled 
























































For a long-run relationship to exist we expect  i φ  to be significantly different from 
zero. Additionally, when the ARDL (pi,qi) is stable,  i φ  is expected to be negative and less 
than 1 in absolute value. In this case, the long-run relationship is defined by: 
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  20where  it η  is a stationary process. In the steady state, trade balance and FDI are tied 
together with a long-run coefficient of  / ii i θ βφ = − . Moreover, the parameter   is the 
short-run coefficient relating FDI inflows to the trade balance. We determine the optimal 
lag structure using the Akaike selection criterion, starting with a maximum lag length of 
two.    
*
ij δ
Instead of using the PMG estimator, we could use the alternatives, the Dynamic 
Fixed Effects (DFE) or Mean Group (MG) estimators as proposed by Pesaran et al. 
(1999a). The former imposes homogeneity of all slope coefficients allowing only the 
intercepts to vary across countries, while the latter allows not only the intercept to differ 
across individuals but also the slope coefficients and the error variances. One advantage 
of the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator over the Dynamic Fixed Effects (DFE) 
estimator is that it allows for the short-run dynamics to differ across countries. 
Moreover, the PMG estimator has the advantage over the MG estimator that it 
performs well even when the number of cross sections is small. Hsiao et al. (1998) have 
shown that if at least one dimension of the panel is small, the MG estimator, although 
consistent, is not a good estimator. Additionally, in small samples, the MG estimator, 
unlike the PMG estimator, being an unweighted average is very sensitive to the inclusion 
of outliers. As mentioned in the previous section, we have observations in our sample, 
especially during the post-EMU era, in which FDI inflows take extreme values.  
Finally, as shown by Pesaran et al. (1999b), an additional advantage of the ARDL 
model is that it yields consistent estimates of the long-run parameters, irrespective of 
whether the underlying regressors are stationary, nonstationary or mutually cointegrated. 
In other words, this procedure allows inferences to be made in the absence of any a priori 
information about the order of integration of the series under investigation. This property 
of the ARDL model can be extremely useful in our case for two reasons. First, given the 
low power of the panel unit root tests, it is difficult to draw safe inference for the 
statistical properties of our data. Second, in the next section we will use alternative 
specifications in order to check the sensitivity of our results. 
 
  214.2. Results 
As a preliminary step in Table 6 we provide some evidence for the importance of 
external accounts for the determination of sovereign spreads in the euro area during the 
post-EMU era.
11 More specifically, in accordance with the existing literature, we observe 
that current account deficits relative to Germany are positively related to sovereign 
spreads in the long run [see e.g. Alexopoulou et al. (2009), Attinasi et al. (2009) and 
Barrios et al. (2009)].
12 Hence, the higher the current account deficit, the more the 
economy is perceived as vulnerable to reversals in international flows of funding. In 
addition, as expected, results indicate that government debt (budget balance) is positively 
(negatively) related to sovereign spreads. 
Table 6 here 
Moving a step further, the results of estimating equation (14) for the northern 
European countries and the southern European countries are presented in Tables 7 and 8, 
respectively, using annual data for the period 1980-2009. Lags throughout the analysis 
are chosen on the basis of AIC with a maximum of 2 lags and are allowed to vary across 
countries.
13 Moreover, the error correction term is negative and statistically significant in 
all estimations for both panels, indicating the presence of a long-run relationship. As far 
as the short-run effects are concerned, we observe in column (1) that FDI is negatively 
and significantly related to the trade balance for the case of the “North”, while it is 
insignificant for the case of the “South”. This short-run effect can be justified if it is 
based on the fact that foreign affiliates require imported inputs and products from the 
home country [see e.g. Head and Ries (2001)]. These imported goods can be intermediate 
and capital goods that serve as vehicles of positive externalities and improve the host 
country’s trade balance in the long run though (see Fontagne (1999)). Still UNCTAD 
(1998) argues that many of these imports can be consumer goods that fail to carry such 
benefits. 
                                                 
11 In these estimations we include Belgium in our sample, while when Belgium is dropped from regressions results 
remain unaffected.   
12 Qualitative results remain unaffected when we use in the right hand side of the estimated equation the trade balance 
instead of the current account balance. In addition, we get similar results if we split the euro area countries into the 
northern and the southern group.    
13 It is worth noting that results remain unaffected when we impose a uniform one-lag structure for all countries and 
variables entering the model. 
  22Tables 7 and 8 here 
Regarding the long-run coefficient, results indicate that FDI is positively 
(negatively) related to the trade balance in the “North” (“South”). This result is 
associated with the composition of inward FDI inflows, which differs significantly 
between the two groups. More specifically, the “North” has attracted a lot more FDI 
inflows into the productive sector in comparison with the “South”, where FDI inflows 
were dominated by investment in real estate activities. Hence, in the “North”, although in 
the short run the FDI effects on the trade balance seem to be detrimental, in the long run 
the effect is reversed. The accumulated capital that is associated with the FDI inflows 
improves competitiveness and the productivity of the host country in the long run and 
consequently the trade balance. On the other hand, in the “South”, where FDI inflows are 
concentrated mostly in activities other than the productive sector, in the long run the 
associated externalities are vague and intangible and the trade balance deteriorates. 
In order to assess the consistency of our results we report in Tables 7.1 and 8.1 
some standard tests on the functional form of the country-specific estimates. More 
specifically, we perform the Breusch (1978) test for serial correlation, the Ramsey (1969) 
reset test for functional-form misspecification, the Jarque-Bera (1980) test for the 
normality of the errors and the White (1980) test for heteroskedasticity. From the results 
derived only Austria from the “North” and Italy from the “South” display some 
problematic statistics. It should be noted that when we drop these countries from our 
estimations, the results remain unaffected, indicating that the models are correctly 
specified.
14
Tables 7.1 and 8.1 here 
As a second step we attempt to estimate the FDI effect on trade balance at the 
industry level. Two points are worth making before discussing the results. First, data 
availability did not allow us to estimate the effect of FDI real estate on trade balance. 
Alternatively, we manage to split FDI inflows in the manufacturing and non-
manufacturing sector. FDI in the non-manufacturing sector contains all FDI inflows other 
than the FDI inflows in the manufacturing sector. Second, we understand that FDI non-
                                                 
14 Results are available upon request.  
  23manufacturing, especially for the “North”, contains productive investment (e.g. 
electricity, gas and water or transports, storage and communication) but it is the best we 
can do based on data availability. Hence, in the second column of Tables 7 and 8 we 
estimate the effect of FDI manufacturing and FDI non-manufacturing on trade balance, 
for the “North” and the “South” respectively.  
Initially, we observe that the short-run coefficients are insignificant in both tables. 
By contrast, we find the long-run coefficient of variable FDI manufacturing to be 
positively and significantly (insignificantly) related to trade balance for the “North” 
(“South”). This is the expected result for the “North”, since when an economy 
accumulates capital in the productive/traded sector the associated positive externalities 
can improve the trade balance in the long run. On the contrary, for the “South” the result 
is most probably attributed to two factors. First, because the “South” has attracted a small 
amount of FDI inflows in the manufacturing sector in both the pre-EMU and post-EMU 
eras. Hence, the associated externalities in the long-run are intangible. Second, because 
both export-oriented high-tech manufacturing goods and labour intensive textiles are 
included in manufacturing FDI, but they are expected to affect a country’s productivity in 
a different way. So, these results suggest that one should take a closer look on the 
composition of FDI manufacturing inflows.  Unfortunately, data availability does not 
allow us to compare the composition in the manufacturing sector for the “North” and the 
“South” and draw safe inferences.  
Regarding, the long-run effect of FDI non-manufacturing on trade balance, the 
results depicted show a positive (negative) effect for the “North” (“South”). The result for 
the “North” is less expected, but it is related to the fact that the “North” has attracted a 
great amount of productive investments in the non-manufacturing sector, especially after 
the creation of EMU. As far as the “South” is concerned, FDI non-manufacturing has the 
expected negative effect on trade balance, since the non-manufacturing sector in the 
“South” is dominated by investment in real estate activities. These results are in line with 
our findings for the trade effect of total FDI inflows in the two groups. In particular, for 
the “North” (“South”) we get a positive (negative) long-run effect for FDI since it has 
attracted more FDI in the productive (real estate) sector. Of course these are some 
preliminary evidence of the effect of industry level FDI inflows on the trade balance at 
  24the macro level. If we were unconstrained by data availability, we could have checked for 
structural breaks in both variables, FDI manufacturing and FDI non-manufacturing, in 
the pre-EMU and post-EMU eras, since the composition of both variables is of 
paramount importance. For the same reason, we cannot add control variables in the 
specification of column (2), as we will do for our basic specification in equation (14). 
Hence, in the third column of Tables 7 and 8 we want to ensure that our findings 
are not product of a particular specification. For this reason, we add to our estimated 
equation the real GDP growth rate (GROWTH) and the real effective exchange rate index 
(REER). We add GROWTH, since according to Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002), increased 
economic integration is likely to lead to a decrease in saving and an increase in 
investment and so to a deterioration of external balance. This effect can be very strong 
especially in the case of the poorer southern European countries that are catching up with 
the union’s average income. Moreover, an increase in the growth rate of output, which is 
associated with enhanced imports in consumer goods, can similarly cause the trade 
balance to deteriorate [see e.g. Abel and Bernanke (2001), Gandolfo (2004)].
15  
Regarding the REER variable, we expect relative prices and heterogeneity of 
competitiveness between the two groups to be an important determinant of the diverging 
external accounts [see e.g. Arghyrou and Chortareas (2008), Lee and Chinn (2006)]. It is 
worth noting that we expect REER to be closely related to productivity shocks caused by 
the FDI inflows, but relative prices are not solely determined by this factor. In fact, we 
believe that variables FDI and REER act complementarily in our estimated equation. 
Regarding the results, in Tables 7 and 8 we get the expected signs for our new control 
variables. More specifically, an increase in the REER (GROWTH) variable causes the 
external balance to deteriorate. Finally, results for the FDI variable remain unaffected in 
both specifications.  
As a next step, in column (4) of Tables 7 and 8 we proceed by applying quarterly 
data instead of annual data in the specification of column (3), but once again results for 
FDI remain unaffected. The reason for using quarterly data is that we want to check for a 
break in the trade balance-FDI nexus in the pre-EMU and the post-EMU eras and have 
                                                 
15 An increase in REER index for each country indicates deterioration of competitiveness and vice versa. 
  25an adequate number of observations for both sample periods. Hence, the final step in our 
empirical analysis is to split our sample in two to sub-periods, 1980-1998 and 1999-2009. 
Indeed in column 5 of Tables 7 and 8, which refer to the pre-EMU era, we get a positive 
long-run relationship between trade balance and  FDI for both groups. This result is 
meaningful if we bear in mind that that the FDI characteristics were more or less the 
same in the pre-EMU era. These characteristics, though, changed significantly after the 
creation of EMU. As can be seen, in the sixth column of Table 7 (8) we derive a positive 
(negative) long-run trade balance-FDI relationship for the “North” (“South”). Hence, we 
have strong evidence that the diffusion of investment in the unproductive/non-traded 




Despite the threat that huge external deficits might pose for the sustainability of the 
common currency, they did not attract extensive policy attention from the start of EMU. 
In recent years, during which external deficits reached alarming levels, a public debate on 
the potential threats to the economies of southern Europe and their viability within the 
euro area has started to take place. 
This paper suggests that differences in FDI inflows among the member states of the 
euro area have resulted in productivity gaps and have therefore constituted a crucial 
determinant of external accounts. Hence, although almost all member states have 
attracted massive FDI inflows, especially since the creation of EMU, there seems to exist 
a sharp differentiation between the “North” and the “South” regarding their size and 
composition. More specifically, the “North” has attracted a lot more FDI inflows into the 
traded sector in comparison with the “South”, where FDI inflows have been dominated 
by investment in real estate activities. Our results reveal that these different patterns have 
resulted in a positive relationship between FDI inflows and trade balances in the “North”, 
while the opposite holds for the “South”. Additionally, these results seem to be driven by 
the sub-period 1999-2009 during which we observe a substantial net inflow of FDI into 
the euro area. Finally, when we use industry level data we find a positive (negative) long-
  26run relationship between FDI in the manufacturing (non-manufacturing) sector and the 
trade balance for the “North” (“South”). 
In conclusion, member states should not solely be interested in attracting FDI 
inflows, but they should also care about their “quality”. Disparities in external accounts 
and productivity gaps seem to be closely related with the composition of FDI inflows 
attracted by the two groups of the euro area. 
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  32Appendix B: Solving the two-sector model 
Factor shares  in the two sectors are given by the familiar expressions: 
         and (1 ) K TT H T T R KY R H Y α α == −      (A1a) 
and (1 ) K NN H N N R KY R H Y β β == −                     (A1b) 
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In the above expression, λ  is the shadow price of external assets, Q is the asset price of 
installed traded capital and   the relative price of non-traded goods both expressed in 
terms of foreign asset prices. The first order conditions with respect to {  yield:  
p
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Dividing by parts and using (4b) we obtain the shares of consumption as: 
C CT ⋅ =θ          ( A 5 a )  
p
C
CN ⋅ − = ) 1 ( θ              (A5b) 
Consumption rule 
Given the shares of consumption in (12), the consumer price index is equal to 
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  33Differentiating (A5a,b) and using (A6), the growth rates of traded and non-traded 
consumption are obtained as: 
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Differentiating (A4a,b) and using (A7), the growth rate of total consumption is finally 
determined as a function of world rates, preferences and the inflation rate  by the 
expression: 
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Investment rule 
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Dynamics of adjustment 
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  34Equations (A11a and b) can be used to determine the dynamics of adjustment to 
equilibrium for the steady-state values of asset prices and the relative price of non-traded 
goods. We distinguish the following two cases: 
(i) Productive sector relatively intensive in FDI   ) ( β α > : The equilibrium loci for the 
prices of traded and non-traded capital (Q*, p*) are depicted in Figure 7a. Since p* is 
independent of Q*, its locus is a vertical line, while the asset price locus is a downward 
slopping curve. The unique equilibrium is given by   and the dynamics of adjustment 
imply a saddle-path   If there is a permanent fall in the world real interest rate (r ) , 
the first locus remains the same, while the asset price locus moves upwards. Adjustment 
takes place by the asset price jumping onto the new saddle-path  , leading to a new 
equilibrium   with a higher asset price  . The price of the non-traded goods is 
reaching gradually a lower equilibrium
0 E
. 0 0S S
1 1S S
1 E 10 ( QQ > )
) ( 0 1 p p < . Calculation of equilibrium values from 
(A11a, b) is straightforward. 
(ii) Service sector relatively intensive in FDI  ) ( β α < : The equilibrium loci for the 
prices of traded and non-traded capital (Q*,p*) are now depicted in Figure 7b. The p* 
locus is again a vertical line,  but now the asset price locus is an  upward slopping curve 
as implied by (A11a) and moves leftwards with a rise in interest rates. The equilibrium is 
unique and given by  , but the system is not saddle-path stable anymore as it is clearly 
shown by the dynamics of adjustment.  Thus, when there is a permanent rise in interest 
rate I, both the asset price and the non-traded price have to jump on the new equilibrium 
 and take higher values: 
0 E
2 E
2020 (, QQpp >> ) . 
Proof of Proposition 4:  
Setting the shares as  / , / T KK HH T τ η == , production functions (1a) and (1b) are 
rewritten as 
1 () ( ) T YA K H
α α τη
− =                      (A12a) 
 
1 [(1 ) ] [(1 ) ] N YB K H
β β τη
− =− −            (A12b) 
  35From (7a) and (7b) we obtain two expressions for the ratio H/K, and equating them we 
get 
1/ 1 1/ 1
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Combining (A13) and (A14) the fraction of FDI allocated in the traded sector is given as 













    (A15) 
where     
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        (A16) 
with partial differentials given as 
1





















      (A17b) 
The sign of the latter is not clear and two cases are distinguished: 
(i)  For α β > , we have  / K 0 τ ∂∂> . Thus if dp<0, we combine (A17a, b) and (A16) 
to get  0 dτ > . If  dp>0, the direction of total change in (τ ) is uncertain. 
(ii)   For α β < , we have   / K 0 τ ∂∂< . With  dp>0 ,  it clearly follows that  0 dτ < . 
  36Appendix C: Tables 
Table 1. Trade balances in the euro area as % of GDP 
COUNTRY 1980-1998  1999-2009  CHANGE 
Austria -0.115  3.119  3.234 
Finland 2.380  6.976  4.596 
Germany 1.895  4.191  2.296 
Ireland 3.751  12.966  9.215 
Netherlands 4.069  6.601    2.532 
North (average)  2.396 6.771  4.375 
France 0.919  0.097  -0.822 
Greece -6.688  -8.258  -1.57 
Italy 0.927    0.412  -0.515 
Portugal -9.725  -8.756  0.969 
Spain -0.869  -3.683  -2.814 




Table 2. FDI inflows in the euro area as % of GDP 
COUNTRY  1980-1998 1999-2009 CHANGE 
Austria  0.644 5.644 5.000 
Finland  0.976 3.125 2.149 
Germany  0.255 2.459 2.204 
Ireland  2.062 7.82  5.758 
Netherlands  2.407 7.176 4.769 
North (average)  1.268 5.244 3.976 
France  0.969 2.994 2.025 
Greece  1.074 0.844 -0.230 
Italy  0.307 1.228 0.921 
Portugal  1.609 2.766 1.157 
Spain  1.615 3.634 2.019 
South (average)  1.115 2.293 1.178 
Source: IFS 
  37Table 3. Estimated breaks 
  Trade balance  FDI 
COUNTRY  No.   Breakpoint  No.   Breakpoint 
Austria  2 1983,1997  1 2004 
Finland  2 1992,2002  1 1997 
Germany  2 1989,2001  2 1996,2000 
Ireland  2 1984,  2004  2 1997,  2003 
Netherlands  2 1985,1998  2 1997,2001 
France  2 1986,1996  2 1998,2004 
Greece  1 2005  1 2005 
Italy  2 1986,1992  2 1999,  2005 
Portugal  1 1986  0 - 
Spain  2 1983,1992  2 1999,  2005 
Notes: The breakpoints were estimated using the Bai and Perron (2003) procedure, while the number of breaks to use for each country 





Table 4. Panel unit root test on TRADE (H0 : no unit root) 
  Trade balance  FDI 
  North South North South 
        
  Test (p-value)  Test (p-value)  Test (p-value)  Test (p-value) 
Breaks (Homogenous)  12.212 (0.000)  8.290 (0.000)  3.867 (0.000)  1.323 (0.093) 
Breaks (Heterogeneous)  14.038 (0.000)  13.368 (0.000)  30.761 (0.000)  2.431 (0.008) 
Notes: The long-run variance is estimated using the Bartlett spectral kernel with automatic spectral window bandwidth selection. The 





Table 5. Results of Kao’s residual cointegration test (H0 : no cointegration) 
  North South 
    
  Test (p-value)  Test (p-value) 
 -2.552  (0.005)  -4.461 (0.000) 
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Table 6. PMG estimations of spreads determinants  
 (1)  (2) 
Long run coefficients   








Fiscal balance  -  -1.571** 
(-2.821) 
Short run coefficients    






















No. of obs.  378  378 
Log likelihood  -1314.557  -1289.381 
Notes: t-statistics are presented in brackets. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and 
* denotes significance at 10% level. Automatic selection of lags based on Akaike information criterion with a max of 2 
lags. 
 
  39Table 7. PMG estimations of Trade determinants for northern European countries  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 























-  - - 




-  - - 
















Short run coefficients        






















Change in FDI manufacturing  - -0.027 
(1.000) 
-  - - 




  -  - 




























No. of obs.  145  90  145  523  300  215 
Log likelihood  -211.058  -121.549  -177.089 -997.993 -547.833 -387.385 




Table 7.1. Individual countries specification tests. Equation 1 
  R
2 Correl. FF  NO  HE 
Austria  0.40 3.24 4.05  14.13  11.69 
Finland  0.14 0.15 0.00 0.63 0.53 
Germany  0.37 0.71 0.01 1.17 0.20 
Ireland  0.61 0.51 0.02 0.97 0.55 
Netherlands  0.08 2.65 0.06 5.51 6.56 
Notes: Correl. stands for first order correlation, FF for functional form test, whereas NO and HE stand for the normality and 





  40Table 8. PMG estimations of trade determinants for southern european countries  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 























- - - - 




- - - - 
















        
Short run coefficients        






















Change in FDI manufacturing  - -0.092 
(0.992) 
- - - - 
Change in FDI non-manufacturing   -0.131 
(-1.000) 
- - - - 




























        
No.  of  obs.  144 109 142 503 296 203 
Log likelihood  -189.029  -126.644  -155.928 -927.816 -538.379 -308.308 




Table 8.1. Individual countries specification tests. equation 1 
  R
2 Correl. FF  NO  HE 
France  0.09 1.32 0.01 0.25 0.57 
Greece  0.35 1.40 0.01 0.09 0.02 
Italy  0.19 0.44 0.97  14.14  0.10 
Portugal  0.73 0.42 3.84 2.00 0.19 
Spain  0.51 0.07 3.49 1.26 0.32 




  41Appendix D: Figures 
 
Figure 1. Correlation between public debt and sovereign spreads for the post-EMU 
era 





















































Figure 2. Correlation between current account balance and sovereign spreads for the 
post-EMU era 
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Notes: This indicator is measured in units ranging from 0 to 2, with higher values corresponding to better governance 
outcomes. We use data from 1996 to 2008.  
Source: World Bank  
 
  45Figure 8a: Adjustment of asset prices after a permanent fall in interest rates 
























  46Figure 8b: Adjustment of asset prices after a permanent fall in interest rates 










Figure 9a.  Price level adjustment after a permanent fall in interest rates  































































  48Figure 11.  External balance adjustment after a permanent fall in interest rates. 
Solid (dotted) line indicates that Traded (Non-traded) sector is intensive in FDI 
External balance 
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